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December 2, 2008
Ms. Lisa Collins
Clerk of the Court of Appeals
Office of the Clerk
450 South State Street, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210
Re:

State v. Dennis Rosa-Re, Case No. 20060432-CA
Rule 24(j) Supplemental Authority Letter

Dear Ms. Collins:
On November 24, 2008, oral argument in the above case occurred before Judges
Bench, Davis, and McHugh.
During argument, I represented that a deferential clear error standard applies in
reviewing a trial court's ruling (step three) on a Bats on objection. See also Brief of Appellee
at 1-2 & 32-35. In rebuttal, defense counsel stated that the Supreme Court refused to apply
a deferential standard in Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008). That statement does
not fairly characterize Snyder.
In Snyder, the Court applied a "clearly erroneous" standard of review to the trial
court's ruling. Id. at 1206. The Court explained:
On appeal, a trial court's ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be
sustained unless it is clearly erroneous. The trial court has a pivotal role in
evaluating Bats on claims. Step three of the Bats on inquiry involves an
evaluation of the prosecutor's credibility, and the best evidence of
discriminatory intent often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises
the challenge. In addition, race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges
often invoke a juror's demeanor (e.g., nervousness, inattention), making the
trial court's first-hand observations of even greater importance. In this

situation, the trial court must evaluate not only whether the prosecutor's
demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror's demeanor
can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the
juror by the prosecutor.
Id. at 1207-08 (citations and internal marks omitted).
The Court recognized that only under "exceptional circumstances" should a trial
court's assessment be rejected. Id. at 1208. The Court then found such circumstances where
(1) an extensive colloquy with the stricken juror belied one of the prosecutor's two
explanations for the strike, (2) the Batson objection was summarily rejected without
explanation or indication as to which of the prosecutor's two explanations the trial court
credited, and (3) the prosecutor otherwise injected race into the capital murder trial. Snyder,
128 S. Ct. at 1208-09. See also State's Supplemental Letter, dated September 9,2008 (with
Snyder opinion attached).
Thank you for your prompt distribution of this letter to the panel judges.
Sincerely,
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
cc: Linda M. Jones
WordPerfect Word Count: 350
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Ms. Lisa Collins
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
Dear Ms. Collins:
Re:

State v. Rosa-Re, Case No. 20060432.

Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant Dennis Rosa-Re
notifies the Utah Court of Appeals of the following pertinent and significant authority:
Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (2008) (attached hereto).
On March 28, 2008, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Snyder v. Louisiana,
128 S.Ct. 1203 (2008), that a prosecutor's reasons for striking a veniremember from the jury
panel constituted discrimination in violation of Batson v. Kentucky ^ 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Snyder pertains to points argued in this case concerning the prosecutor's reasons for striking
veniremembers from the jury panel, and it pertains to review on appeal of the trial court's
ruling. (See Brief of Appellant, dated August 18, 2006, Arguments B. and C, pages 14-18,
20-23,27-30).

Respectfully yours,

Linda M. Jones
Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused an original and 7 copies of
the foregoing to be hand-delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and 4 copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M.
Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114-0854, this~3_ day of September, 2008.

LIN0A M. JONES

Delivered this

day of September, 2008.

128 S.Ct. 1203
128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175, 76 U S L W 4136, 08 Cal,

^Snyder v. Louisiana
U.S.La.,2008.
Supreme Court of the United States
Allen SNYDER, Petitioner,
v.
LOUISIANA
No. 06-10119.
Argued Dec. 4, 2007.
Decided March 19, 2008.
Background: Defendant was convicted
in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District
Court, Parish of Jefferson, Kernan A.
Hand, J., of first-degree murder and was
sentenced to death. Defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court Of Louisiana, 874
So.2d
739,
affirmed.
Granting
defendant's petition for a writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court, 545 U.S.
1137, 125 S.Ct. 2956, 162 L.Ed.2d 884,
vacated the judgment and remanded for
further consideration. On remand, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, 942 So.2d
484, affirmed. Certiorari was granted.
Holding: The Supreme Court, Justice
Alito, held that prosecutor's proffered
reasons for striking black prospective
juror
were
pretext
for
racial
discrimination.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
dissented and filed an opinion.
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HI Jury 230 €^33(5.15)
230 Jury
23011 Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of
Right
230k33 Constitution and
Selection of Jury
230k33(5) Challenges and
Objections
230k33(5.15)
k.
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited
Cases
Batson provides a three-step process for a
trial court to use in adjudicating a claim
that a peremptory challenge was based on
race: (1) a defendant must make a prima
facie showing that a peremptory
challenge has been exercised on the basis
of race; (2) if that showing has been
made, the prosecution must offer a
race-neutral basis for striking the juror in
question; and (3) in light of the parties'
submissions, the trial court must
determine whether the defendant has
shown purposeful discrimination.
12] Criminal Law 110 €^>H58.17
110 Criminal Law
llOXXIV Review
HOXXIV(O) Questions of Fact
and Findings
110kll58.17 k. Jury Selection.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 11 Okl 158(3))
On appeal of Batson claim, a trial court's
ruling on the issue of discriminatory
intent must be sustained unless it is

Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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clearly erroneous.

even greater importance.

131 Jury 230 €>>33(5.15)

151 Jury 230 €^>33(5.15)

230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of
Right
230k33 Constitution and
Selection of Jury
230k33(5) Challenges and
Objections
230k33(5.15)
k.
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited
Cases
Step three of the Batson inquiry involves
an evaluation of the prosecutor's
credibility, and the best evidence of
discriminatory intent often will be the
demeanor of the attorney who exercises
the challenge.

230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of
Right
230k33 Constitution and
Selection of Jury
230k33(5) Challenges and
Objections
230k33(5.15)
k.
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited
Cases
In evaluating Batson claims, the trial
court must evaluate not only whether the
prosecutor's
demeanor
belies
a
discriminatory intent, but also whether
the juror's demeanor can credibly be said
to have exhibited the basis for the strike
attributed to the juror by the prosecutor.

I n j u r y 230 0^33(5.15)
161 Jury 230 €^33(5.15)
230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of
Right
230k33 Constitution and
Selection of Jury
230k33(5) Challenges and
Objections
230k33(5.15)
k.
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited
Cases
In evaluating Batson claims, race-neutral
reasons for peremptory challenges often
invoke a juror's demeanor, such as
nervousness or inattention, making the
trial court's first-hand observations of

230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of
Right
230k33 Constitution and
Selection of Jury
230k33(5) Challenges and
Objections
230k33(5.15)
k.
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited
Cases
Prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking
black prospective juror in capital murder
trial, that prospective juror was nervous
during voir dire and that he might have
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been motivated to find defendant guilty of
lesser included offense to obviate the
need for a penalty phase and thereby
minimize the student teaching hours he
would miss, were pretext for racial
discrimination; prospective juror, after
being informed during voir dire that the
court had contacted his dean, who
informed the court that he would work
with the prospective juror to see that he
was able to make up any student-teaching
time that he missed due to jury service,
did not express any further concern about
serving on the jury, prosecutor had
anticipated on the record during voir dire
that trial would be brief, trial and penalty
phase were completed two days after
prospective juror was struck, and
prosecutor accepted white jurors who
disclosed conflicting obligations that
were at least as serious as black
prospective juror.
121 Criminal Law 110 €^1134.38
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
llOXXIVfL) Scope of Review in
General
110XXIV(L)4 Scope of Inquiry
110kll34.38
k.
Summoning, Impaneling, or Selection of
Jury. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 11 Okl 134(5))
Jury 230 €^33(5.15)
230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of

Right
230k33 Constitution and
Selection of Jury
230k33(5) Challenges and
Objections
230k33(5.15)
k.
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited
Cases
In considering a Batson objection, or in
reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson
error, all of the circumstances that bear
upon the issue of racial animosity must be
consulted.
*1204 Syllabus

ml

FN* The syllabus constitutes no
part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared by the Reporter
of Decisions for the convenience
of the reader. See United States v.
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200
U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50
L.Ed. 499.
During voir dire in petitioner's capital
murder case, the prosecutor used
peremptory strikes to eliminate black
prospective jurors who had survived
challenges for cause. The jury convicted
petitioner and sentenced him to death.
Both on direct appeal and on remand in
light ofMiller-Elv. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,
125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196, the
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected
petitioner's claim that the prosecution's
peremptory strikes of certain prospective
jurors, including Mr. Brooks, were based
on race, in violation of Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712,
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90 L.Ed.2d 69.
Held: The trial judge committed clear
error in rejecting the Batson objection to
the strike of Mr. Brooks. Pp. 1207 - 1212.
(a) Under Batson's three-step process for
adjudicating claims such as petitioner's,
(1) a defendant must make a prima facie
showing that the challenge was based on
race; (2) if so, " 'the prosecution must
offer a race-neutral basis for striking the
juror in question5 "; and (3) " 'in light of
the parties' submissions, the trial court
must determine whether the defendant
has shown purposeful discrimination.'
" Miller-El supra at 277, 125 S.Ct. 2317
(THOMAS, J., dissenting) (quoting
*1205Miller- El v. Cockrell 537 U.S.
322. 328-329, 123 S.Ct 1029, 154
L.Ed.2d 931).
Unless it is clearly
erroneous, the trial court's ruling must be
sustained on appeal. The trial court's role
is pivotal, for it must evaluate the
demeanor of the prosecutor exercising the
challenge and the juror being excluded.
Pp. 1207 - 1208.
(b) While all of the circumstances bearing
on the racial-animosity issue must be
consulted in considering a Batson
objection or reviewing a ruling claimed to
be a Batson error, the explanation given
for striking Mr. Brooks, a college senior
attempting to fulfill his student-teaching
obligation, is insufficient by itself and
suffices for a Batson error determination.
Pp. 1208-1212.
(1) It cannot be presumed that the trial

court credited the prosecution's first
race-neutral reason, that Mr. Brooks
looked nervous. Deference is owed to a
trial judge's finding that an attorney
credibly relied on demeanor in exercising
a strike, but here, the trial judge simply
allowed
the
challenge
without
explanation. Since Mr. Brooks was not
challenged until the day after he was
questioned and thus after dozens of other
jurors had been called, the judge might
not have recalled his demeanor. Or he
may have found such consideration
unnecessary, instead basing his ruling on
the second proffered reason for the strike.
Pp. 1208 - 1209.
(2)
That
reason-Mr.
Brooks'
student-teaching obligation-fails even
under the highly deferential standard of
review applicable here. Mr. Brooks was 1
of more than 50 venire members
expressing concern that jury service or
sequestration would interfere with work,
school, family, or other obligations.
Although he was initially concerned
about making up lost teaching time, he
expressed no further concern once a law
clerk reported that the school's dean
would work with Mr. Brooks if he missed
time for a trial that week, and the
prosecutor did not question him more
deeply about the matter. The proffered
reason must be evaluated in light of the
circumstances that the colloquy and law
clerk report took place on Tuesday, the
prosecution struck Mr. Brooks on
Wednesday, the trial's guilt phase ended
on Thursday, and its penalty phase ended
on Friday. The prosecutor's scenario-that
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Mr. Brooks would have been inclined to
find petitioner guilty of a lesser included
offense to obviate the need for a penalty
phase-is both highly speculative and
unlikely. Mr. Brooks would be in a
position to shorten the trial only if most or
all of the jurors had favored a lesser
verdict. Perhaps most telling, the trial's
brevity, which the prosecutor anticipated
on the record during voir dire, meant that
jury service would not have seriously
interfered with Mr. Brooks' ability to
complete his student teaching. The dean
offered to work with him, and the trial
occurred relatively early in the fall term,
giving Mr. Brooks several weeks to make
up the time. The implausibility of the
prosecutor's explanation is reinforced by
his acceptance of white jurors who
disclosed conflicting obligations that
appear to have been at least as serious as
Mr. Brooks'. Under Batsoris third stage,
the prosecution's pretextual explanation
gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory intent. There is no need to
decide here whether, in Batson cases,
once a discriminatory intent is shown to
be a motivating factor, the burden shifts
to the prosecution to show that the
discriminatory
factor
was
not
determinative. It is enough to recognize
that a peremptory strike shown to have
been motivated in substantial part by
discriminatory intent could not be
sustained based on any lesser showing by
the prosecution. The record here does not
show that the prosecution would have
pre-emptively challenged Mr. Brooks
based on his nervousness alone, *1206
and there is no realistic possibility that the

subtle question of causation could be
profitably explored further on remand
more than a decade after petitioner's trial.
Pp. 1208 - 1212.
942 So.2d 484, reversed and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and
STEVENS, KENNEDY,
SOUTER,
G1NSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which SCALIA, J., joined.
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel of Record,
Southern Center for Human Rights,
Atlanta, Georgia, Jelpi P. Picou, Jr.,
Marcia Widder, Capital Appeals Project,
New Orleans, Louisiana, for Petitioner.
Paul D. Connick, Jr., District Attorney,
Jefferson Parish, State of Louisiana,
Terry M. Boudreaux, Counsel of Record,
Assistant District Attorney, Gretna,
Louisiana, for Respondent.For U.S.
Supreme Court briefs, see:2007 WL
2605447 (Pet.Brief)2007 WL 3307731
(Resp .Brief)2007
WL
4218010
(Reply .Brief)
Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of
the Court.
Petitioner Allen Snyder was convicted of
first-degree murder in a Louisiana court
and was sentenced to death. He asks us to
review a decision of the Louisiana
Supreme Court rejecting his claim that
the prosecution exercised some of its
peremptory jury challenges based on
race, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d
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69 (1986). We hold that the trial court
committed clear error in its ruling on a
Batson objection, and we therefore
reverse.
I
The crime for which petitioner was
convicted occurred in August 1995. At
that time, petitioner and his wife, Mary,
had separated. On August 15, they
discussed the possibility of reconciliation,
and Mary agreed to meet with petitioner
the next day. That night, Mary went on a
date with Howard Wilson. During the
evening, petitioner repeatedly attempted
to page Mary, but she did not respond. At
approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 16,
Wilson drove up to the home of Maryfs
mother to drop Mary off. Petitioner was
waiting at the scene armed with a knife.
He opened the driver's side door of
Wilson's car and repeatedly stabbed the
occupants, killing Wilson and wounding
Mary.
The State charged petitioner with
first-degree murder and sought the death
penalty based on the aggravating
circumstance
that
petitioner
had
knowingly created a risk of death or great
bodily harm to more than one person. See
La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art.
905.4(A)(4) (West Supp.2008).
Voir dire began on Tuesday, August 27,
1996, and proceeded as follows. During
the first phase, the trial court screened the
panel to identify jurors who did not meet
Louisiana's requirements for jury service

or claimed that service on the jury or
sequestration for the duration of the trial
would result in extreme hardship. More
than 50 prospective jurors reported that
they had work, family, or other
commitments that would interfere with
jury service. In each of those instances,
the nature of the conflicting commitments
was explored, and some of these jurors
were dismissed. App. 58-164.
In the next phase, the court randomly
selected panels of 13 potential jurors for
*1207 further questioning. Id., at
166-167. The defense and prosecution
addressed each panel and questioned the
jurors both as a group and individually.
At the conclusion of this questioning, the
court ruled on challenges for cause. Then,
the prosecution and the defense were
given the opportunity to use peremptory
challenges (each side had 12) to remove
remaining jurors. The court continued
this process of calling 13-person panels
until the jury was filled. In accordance
with Louisiana law, the parties were
permitted to exercise "backstrikes." That
is, they were allowed to use their
peremptories up until the time when the
final jury was sworn and thus were
permitted to strike jurors whom they had
initially accepted when the jurors' panels
were called. See La. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann., Art. 795(b)(1); State v. Taylor,
93-2201, pp. 22-23 (La.2/28/96), 669
So.2d 364, 376.
Eighty-five prospective jurors were
questioned as members of a panel.
Thirty-six of these survived challenges
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for cause; 5 of the 36 were black; and all 5
of the prospective black jurors were
eliminated by the prosecution through the
use of peremptory strikes. The jury found
petitioner guilty of first-degree murder
and determined that he should receive the
death penalty.
On direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme
Court conditionally affirmed petitioner's
conviction. The court rejected petitioner's
Batson claim but remanded the case for a
nunc pro tunc determination of
petitioner's competency to stand trial.
State v. Snyder. 98-1078 (La.4/14/99),
750 So.2d 832. Two justices dissented
and would have found a Batson violation.
See id., at 866 (Johnson, J., dissenting),
863 (Lemmon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
On remand, the trial court found that
petitioner had been competent to stand
trial, and the Louisiana Supreme Court
affirmed that determination. State v.
Snyder. 1998-1078 (La.4/14/04), 874
So.2d 739. Petitioner petitioned this
Court for a writ of certiorari, and while
his petition was pending, this Court
decided Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196
(2005). We then granted the petition,
vacated the judgment, and remanded the
case to the Louisiana Supreme Court for
further consideration in light of
Miller-El See Snyder v. Louisiana, 545
U.S. 1137, 125 S.Ct. 2956, 162 L.Ed.2d
884 (2005). On remand, the Louisiana
Supreme Court again rejected Snyder's
Batson claim, this time by a vote of 4 to 3.

See 1998-1078 (La.9/6/06), 942 So.2d
484. We again granted certiorari, 551
U.S. — , 127 S.Ct. 3004. 168 L.Ed.2d
726 (2007), and now reverse.
II
[1] Batson provides a three-step process
for a trial court to use in adjudicating a
claim that a peremptory challenge was
based on race:
" 'First, a defendant must make a prima
facie showing that a peremptory
challenge has been exercised on the
basis of race[; s]econd, if that showing
has been made, the prosecution must
offer a race-neutral basis for striking the
juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of
the parties' submissions, the trial court
must determine whether the defendant
has shown purposeful discrimination.'
" Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, at 277[,
125 S.Ct. 23171 (THOMAS, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328-329L 123
S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 9311 (2003)).
r21[3ir41|"51 On appeal, a trial court's
ruling on the issue of discriminatory
intent must be sustained unless it is
clearly erroneous. See Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859,
114L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)^1208 (plurality
opinion); id, at 372, 111 S.Ct. 1859
(O'Connor, J., joined by SCALIA, J.,
concurring in judgment). The trial court
has a pivotal role in evaluating Batson
claims. Step three of the Batson inquiry
involves an evaluation of the prosecutor's
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credibility, see 476 U.S., at 98, n. 21, 106
S.Ct. 1712, and "the best evidence [of
discriminatory intent] often will be the
demeanor of the attorney who exercises
the challGngz^Hernandez, 500 U.S., at
365, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (plurality opinion).
In addition, race-neutral reasons for
peremptory challenges often invoke a
juror's demeanor (e.g., nervousness,
inattention), making the trial court's
first-hand observations of even greater
importance. In this situation, the trial
court must evaluate not only whether the
prosecutor's
demeanor
belies
a
discriminatory intent, but also whether
the juror's demeanor can credibly be said
to have exhibited the basis for the strike
attributed to the juror by the prosecutor.
We have recognized that these
determinations
of credibility
and
demeanor lie " 'peculiarly within a trial
judge's province,'
"ibid. (quoting
Wainwrizht v. Witt 469 U.S. 412, 428,
105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)),
and we have stated that "in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, we would
defer to [the trial court]." 500 U.S., at
366,111 S.Ct. 1859.
Ill
[6] Petitioner centers his Batson claim on
the prosecution's strikes of two black
jurors, Jeffrey Brooks and Elaine Scott.
Because we find that the trial court
committed clear error in overruling
petitioner's Batson objection with respect
to Mr. Brooks, we have no need to
consider petitioner's claim regarding Ms.
Scott. See, e.g., United States v.

Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (C.A.9
1994) ("[T]he Constitution forbids
striking even a single prospective juror
for a discriminatory purpose"); United
States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 105 (C.A.4
1989); United States v. demons, 843
F.2d 741, 747 (C.A.3 1988); United
States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086
(C.A.8 1987); United States v. David, 803
F.2dl567, 157UC.A.11 1986).
£7] In Miller-El v. Dretke, the Court made
it clear that in considering a Batson
objection, or in reviewing a ruling
claimed to be Batson error, all of the
circumstances that bear upon the issue of
racial animosity must be consulted. 545
U.S., at 239, 125 S.Ct. 2317. Here, as
just one example, if there were persisting
doubts as to the outcome, a court would
be required to consider the strike of Ms.
Scott for the bearing it might have upon
the strike of Mr. Brooks. In this case,
however, the explanation given for the
strike of Mr. Brooks is by itself
unconvincing and suffices for the
determination that there was Batson error.
When defense counsel made a Batson
objection concerning the strike of Mr.
Brooks, a college senior who was
attempting to fulfill his student-teaching
obligation, the prosecution offered two
race-neutral reasons for the strike. The
prosecutor explained:
"I thought about it last night. Number 1,
the main reason is that he looked very
nervous to me throughout the
questioning. Number 2, he's one of the
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fellows that came up at the beginning
[of voir dire] and said he was going to
miss class. He's a student teacher. My
main concern is for that reason, that
being that he might, to go home quickly,
come back with guilty of a lesser verdict
so there wouldn't be a penalty phase.
Those are my two reasons." App. 444.
Defense
counsel
disputed
both
explanations, id., at 444-445, and the trial
judge ruled as follows: "All right. I'm
going to allow the challenge. I'm going to
allow the challenge." Id., at 445. We
discuss *1209 the prosecution's two
proffered grounds for striking Mr. Brooks
in turn.
A
With respect to the first reason, the
Louisiana Supreme Court was correct that
"nervousness cannot be shown from a
cold transcript, which is why ... the [trial]
judge's evaluation must be given much
deference." 942 So.2d, at 496. As noted
above, deference is especially appropriate
where a trial judge has made a finding
that an attorney credibly relied on
demeanor in exercising a strike. Here,
however, the record does not show that
the trial judge actually made a
determination concerning Mr. Brooks'
demeanor. The trial judge was given two
explanations for the strike. Rather than
making a specific finding on the record
concerning Mr. Brooks' demeanor, the
trial judge simply allowed the challenge
without explanation. It is possible that the
judge did not have any impression one

way or the other concerning Mr. Brooks'
demeanor. Mr. Brooks was not
challenged until the day after he was
questioned, and by that time dozens of
other jurors had been questioned. Thus,
the trial judge may not have recalled Mr.
Brooks' demeanor. Or, the trial judge may
have found it unnecessary to consider Mr.
Brooks' demeanor, instead basing his
ruling completely on the second proffered
justification for the strike. For these
reasons, we cannot presume that the trial
judge credited the prosecutor's assertion
that Mr. Brooks was nervous.
B
The second reason proffered for the strike
of Mr. Brooks-his student-teaching
obligation-fails even under the highly
deferential standard of review that is
applicable here. At the beginning of voir
dire, when the trial court asked the
members of the venire whether jury
service or sequestration would pose an
extreme hardship, Mr. Brooks was 1 of
more than 50 members of the venire who
expressed concern that jury service or
sequestration would interfere with work,
school, family, or other obligations.
When Mr. Brooks came forward, the
following exchange took place:
"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: ... I'm a
student at Southern University, New
Orleans. This is my last semester. My
major requires me to student teach, and
today I've already missed a half a day.
That is part of my-it's required for me to
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graduate this semester.
"[DEFENSE
COUNSEL]:
Mr.
Brooks, if you-how many days would
you miss if you were sequestered on this
jury? Do you teach every day?

*1210 "MR. JEFFREY BROOKS:
Actually, I spoke to my Dean, Doctor
Tillman, who's at the university
probably right now.
"THE COURT: All right.

"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Five days
a week.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Five days
a week.

"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Would
you like to speak to him?
"THE COURT: Yeah.

"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: And it's
8:30 through 3:00.

"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: I don't
have his card on me.

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If you
missed this week, is there any way that
you could make it up this semester?

"THE COURT: Why don't you give [a
law clerk] his number, give [a law
clerk] his name and we'll call him and
we'll see what we can do.

"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Well, the
first two weeks I observe, the remaining
I begin teaching, so there is something
I'm missing right now that will better
me towards my teaching career.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Is there
any way that you could make up the
observed observation [sic] that you're
missing today, at another time?
"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: It may be
possible, I'm not sure.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So
that"THE COURT: Is there anyone we
could call, like a Dean or anything, that
we could speak to?

"(MR. JEFFREY BROOKS LEFT
THE BENCH).'5 App. 102-104.
Shortly thereafter, the court again spoke
with Mr. Brooks:
"THE LAW CLERK: Jeffrey Brooks,
the requirement for his teaching is a
three hundred clock hour observation.
Doctor Tillman at Southern University
said that as long as it's just this week, he
doesn't see that it would cause a
problem with Mr. Brooks completing
his observation time within this
semester.

"(MR. BROOKS APPROACHED
THE BENCH)
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"THE COURT: We talked to Doctor
Tillman and he says he doesn't see a
problem as long as it's just this week,
you know, he'll work with you on it.
Okay?
"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: Okay.
"(MR. JEFFREY BROOKS LEFT
THE BENCH)." Id, at 116.
Once Mr. Brooks heard the law clerk's
report about the conversation with Doctor
Tillman, Mr. Brooks did not express any
further concern about serving on the jury,
and the prosecution did not choose to
question him more deeply about this
matter.
The colloquy with Mr. Brooks and the
law clerk's report took place on Tuesday,
August 27; the prosecution struck Mr.
Brooks the following day, Wednesday,
August 28; the guilt phase of petitioner's
trial ended the next day, Thursday,
August 29; and the penalty phase was
completed by the end of the week, on
Friday, August 30.
The prosecutor's second proffered reason
for striking Mr. Brooks must be evaluated
in light of these circumstances. The
prosecutor claimed to be apprehensive
that Mr. Brooks, in order to minimize the
student-teaching hours missed during
jury service, might have been motivated
to find petitioner guilty, not of
first-degree murder, but of a lesser
included offense because this would
obviate the need for a penalty phase

proceeding. But this scenario was highly
speculative. Even if Mr. Brooks had
favored a quick resolution, that would not
have necessarily led him to reject a
finding of first-degree murder. If the
majority of jurors had initially favored a
finding of first-degree murder, Mr.
Brooks' purported inclination might have
led him to agree in order to speed the
deliberations. Only if all or most of the
other jurors had favored the lesser verdict
would Mr. Brooks have been in a position
to shorten the trial by favoring such a
verdict.
Perhaps most telling, the brevity of
petitioner's trial-something that the
prosecutor anticipated on the record
during voir dire —-meant that serving on
the jury would not have seriously
interfered with Mr. Brooks' ability to
complete his required student teaching.
As noted, petitioner's trial was completed
by Friday, August 30. If Mr. Brooks, who
reported to court and was peremptorily
challenged *1211 on Wednesday, August
28, had been permitted to serve, he would
have missed only two additional days of
student teaching, Thursday, August 29,
and Friday, August 30. Mr. Brooks' dean
promised to "work with" Mr. Brooks to
see that he was able to make up any
student-teaching time that he missed due
to jury service; the dean stated that he did
not think that this would be a problem;
and the record contains no suggestion that
Mr. Brooks remained troubled after
hearing the report of the dean's remarks.
In addition, although the record does not
include the academic calendar of Mr.
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Brooks' university, it is apparent that the
trial occurred relatively early in the fall
semester. With many weeks remaining in
the term, Mr. Brooks would have needed
to make up no more than an hour or two
per week in order to compensate for the
time that he would have lost due to jury
service. When all of these considerations
are taken into account, the prosecutor's
second proffered justification for striking
Mr. Brooks is suspicious.
FN1. See, e.g., App. 98, 105, 111,
121, 130,204.
The implausibility of this explanation is
reinforced by the prosecutor's acceptance
of white jurors who disclosed conflicting
obligations that appear to have been at
least as serious as Mr. Brooks'. We
recognize that a retrospective comparison
of jurors based on a cold appellate record
may be very misleading when alleged
similarities were not raised at trial. In that
situation, an appellate court must be
mindful that an exploration of the alleged
similarities at the time of trial might have
shown that the jurors in question were not
really comparable. In this case, however,
the shared characteristic, i.e., concern
about serving on the jury due to
conflicting obligations, was thoroughly
explored by the trial court when the
relevant jurors asked to be excused for
caused
FN2. The Louisiana Supreme
Court did not hold that petitioner
had
procedurally
defaulted
reliance on a comparison of the

African-American jurors whom
the prosecution struck with white
jurors whom the prosecution
accepted. On the contrary, the
State Supreme Court itself made
such a comparison. See 942 So.2d
484, 495-496 (20061
A comparison between Mr. Brooks and
Roland Laws, a white juror, is
particularly striking. During the initial
stage of voir dire, Mr. Laws approached
the court and offered strong reasons why
serving on the sequestered jury would
cause him hardship. Mr. Laws stated that
he was "a self-employed general
contractor," with "two houses that are
nearing completion, one [with the
occupants]
...
moving
in
this
weekend." Id., at 129. He explained that,
if he served on the jury, "the people won't
[be able to] move in." Id, at 130. Mr.
Laws also had demanding family
obligations:
"[M]y wife just had a hysterectomy, so
I'm running the kids back and forth to
school, and we're not originally from
here, so I have no family in the area, so
between the two things, it's kind of bad
timing for me." Ibid.
Although these
obligations
seem
substantially more pressing than Mr.
Brooks', the prosecution questioned Mr.
Laws and attempted to elicit assurances
that he would be able to serve despite his
work and family obligations. See ibid.
(prosecutor asking Mr. Laws "[i]f you got
stuck on jury duty anyway ... would you
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try to make other arrangements as best
you could?"). And the prosecution
declined the opportunity to use a
peremptory strike on Mr. Laws. Id., at
549. If the prosecution had been sincerely
concerned that Mr. Brooks would favor a
lesser verdict than first-degree murder in
order to shorten the trial, it is hard to see
why the prosecution would not have had
at least as much concern regarding Mr.
Laws.
*1212 The situation regarding another
white juror, John Donnes, although less
fully developed, is also significant. At the
end of the first day of voir dire, Mr.
Donnes approached the court and raised
the possibility that he would have an
important work commitment later that
week. Id., at 349. Because Mr. Donnes
stated that he would know the next
morning whether he would actually have
a problem, the court suggested that Mr.
Donnes raise the matter again at that time.
Ibid. The next day, Mr. Donnes again
expressed concern about serving, stating
that, in order to serve, "I'd have to cancel
too many things," including an urgent
appointment at which his presence was
essential. Id., at 467-468. Despite Mr.
Donnes' concern, the prosecution did not
strike him. Id., at 490.
As previously noted, the question
presented at the third stage of the Batson
inquiry is " 'whether the defendant has
shown
purposeful
discrimination.5
" Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.. at 277,
125 S.Ct. 2317.
The prosecution's
proffer of this pretextual explanation

naturally gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory intent. See id., at 252, 125
S.Ct. 2317 (noting the "pretextual
significance" of a "stated reason [that]
does not hold up"); Purkett v. Elem% 514
U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131
L.Ed.2d834fl995)^r curiam) ("At [the
third] stage, implausible or fantastic
justifications may (and probably will) be
found to be pretexts for purposeful
discrimination"); Hernandez, 500 U.S., at
365, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (plurality opinion)
("In the typical peremptory challenge
inquiry, the decisive question will be
whether
counsel's
race-neutral
explanation for a peremptory challenge
should be believed"). Cf. St Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407
(1993) ("[Rejection of the defendant's
proffered [nondiscriminatory] reasons
will permit the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate
fact
of
intentional
discrimination").
In other circumstances, we have held that,
once it is shown that a discriminatory
intent was a substantial or motivating
factor in an action taken by a state actor,
the burden shifts to the party defending
the action to show that this factor was not
determinative. See Hunter v. Underwood,
All U.S. 222, 228, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85
L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). We have not
previously applied this rule in a Batson
case, and we need not decide here
whether that standard governs in this
context. For present purposes, it is
enough to recognize that a peremptory
strike shown to have been motivated in
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substantial part by discriminatory intent
could not be sustained based on any lesser
showing by the prosecution. And in light
of the circumstances here-including
absence of anything in the record
showing that the trial judge credited the
claim that Mr. Brooks was nervous, the
prosecution's description of both of its
proffered
explanations
as
"main
concern[s]," App. 444, and the adverse
inference noted above-the record does not
show that the prosecution would have
pre-emptively challenged Mr. Brooks
based on his nervousness alone. See
Hunter, supra, at 228, 105 S.Ct.
1916.
Nor is there any realistic
possibility that this subtle question of
causation could be profitably explored
further on remand at this late date, more
than a decade after petitioner's trial.

a trial judge's province.' " Hernandez v.
New York 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct.
1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d
841 (1985)); Hernandez, supra, at 372,
111 S.Ct. 1859 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in judgment); ante, at 1208."[I]n the
absence of exceptional circumstances, we
[should] defer to state-court factual
findings." Hernandez, 500 U.S., at 366,
111 S.Ct. 1859. None of the evidence in
the record as to jurors Jeffrey Brooks and
Elaine Scott demonstrates that the trial
court clearly erred in finding they were
not stricken on the basis of race. Because
the trial court's determination was a
"permissible view of the evidence," id.,
at 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859,1 would affirm the
judgment of the Louisiana Supreme
Court.

* * *

We therefore reverse the judgment of the
Louisiana Supreme Court and remand the
case for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice
SCALIA joins, dissenting.
Petitioner essentially asks this Court to
second-guess
the
fact-based
determinations*1213 of the Louisiana
courts as to the reasons for a prosecutor's
decision to strike two jurors. The
evaluation of a prosecutor's motives for
striking a juror is at bottom a credibility
judgment, which lies " ' peculiarly within

© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West.

The Court begins by setting out the
"deferential standard," ante, at 1209, that
we apply to a trial court's resolution of a
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106
S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), claim,
noting that we will overturn a ruling on
the question of discriminatory intent only
if it is "clearly erroneous," ante, at
1208.Under this standard, we "will not
reverse a lower court's finding of fact
simply because we would have decided
the case differently."
Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242, 121 S.Ct.
1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Instead, a
reviewing court must ask "whether, 'on
the entire evidence,' it is 'left with the
definite and firm conviction that a
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mistake has been committed.' " Ibid.
(quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct
525, 92 L.Ed. 746(1948)).
The Court acknowledges two reasons
why a trial court "has a pivotal role in
evaluating Batson claims." Ante, at
1208.First, the Court notes that the trial
court is uniquely situated to judge the
prosecutor's credibility because the best
evidence of discriminatory intent" 'often
will be the demeanor of the attorney who
exercises the challenge.' " Ibid, (quoting
Hernandez, supra, at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859
(plurality opinion)). Second, it recognizes
that the trial court's
"first-hand
observations" of the juror's demeanor are
of "grea[t] importance" in determining
whether the prosecutor's neutral basis for
the strike is credible. Ante, at 1208.
The Court's conclusion, however, reveals
that it is only paying lipservice to the
pivotal role of the trial court. The Court
second-guesses
the
trial
court's
determinations in this case merely
because the judge did not clarify which of
the prosecutor's neutral bases for striking
Mr. Brooks was dispositive. But we have
never suggested that a reviewing court
should defer to a trial court's resolution of
a Batson challenge only if the trial court
made specific findings with respect to
each of the prosecutor's proffered
race-neutral reasons. To the contrary,
when the grounds for a trial court's
decision are ambiguous, an appellate
court should not presume that the lower
court based its decision on an improper

ground, particularly when applying a
deferential standard of review. See
Sprint/United Management Co. v.
Mendelsohn, — U.S. —-„ 128 S.Ct. 1140,
1145, 170 L.Ed.2dl.
The prosecution offered two neutral bases
for striking Mr. Brooks: his nervous
demeanor and his stated concern about
missing class. App. 444. The trial court,
in rejecting defendant's Batson challenge,
stated only "All right. I'm going to allow
the challenge. I'm going to allow the
challenge."*1214 Id, at 445. The Court
concedes that "the record does not show"
whether the trial court made its
determination based on Mr. Brooks'
demeanor or his concern for missing
class, ante, at 1209, but then speculates as
to what the trial court might have thought
about Mr. Brooks' demeanor. As a result
of that speculation, the Court concludes
that it "cannot presume that the trial court
credited the prosecutor's assertion that
Mr. Brooks was nervous." Ibid.
Inexplicably, however, the Court
concludes that it can presume that the
trial court impermissibly relied on the
prosecutor's
supposedly
pretextual
concern about Mr. Brooks' teaching
schedule, even though nothing in the
record supports that interpretation over
the one the Court rejects.
Indeed, if the record suggests anything, it
is that the judge was more influenced by
Mr. Brooks' nervousness than by his
concern for missing class. Following an
exchange about whether his desire to get
back to class would make Mr. Brooks
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more likely to support a verdict on a
lesser included offense because it might
avoid a penalty phase, defense counsel
offered its primary rebuttal to the
prosecutor's proffered neutral reasons.
Immediately after argument on the
nervousness point, the judge ruled on the
Baison challenge, even interrupting the
prosecutor to do so:
"MR. VASQUEZ: His main problem
yesterday was the fact that he didn't
know if he would miss some teaching
time as a student teacher. The clerk
called the school and whoever it was
and the Dean said that wouldn't be a
problem. He was told that this would go
through the weekend, and he expressed
that that was his only concern, that he
didn't have any other problems.
"As far as him looking nervous, hell,
everybody out here looks nervous. I'm
nervous.
"MR. OLINDE: Judge, it's"MR. VASQUEZ: Judge, that's-You
know.
"MR. OLINDE:-a question of this: It's a
peremptory challenge. We need 12 out
of 12 people. Mr. Brooks was very
uncertain and very nervous looking
and"THE COURT: All right. I'm going to
allow the challenge. I'm going to allow
the challenge." App. 445.

Although this exchange is certainly not
hard-and-fast evidence of the trial court's
reasoning, it undermines the Court's
presumption that the trial judge relied
solely on Mr. Brooks' concern for missing
school.
The Court also concludes that the trial
court's determination lacked support in
the record because the prosecutor failed
to strike two other jurors with similar
concerns. Ante, at 1211 - 1212. Those
jurors, however, were never mentioned in
the argument before the trial court, nor
were they discussed in the filings or
opinions on any of the three occasions
this case was considered by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. — Petitioner failed to
suggest a comparison with those two
jurors in his petition for certiorari, and
apparently only discovered this "clear
error" in the record when drafting his
brief before this Court. We have no
business overturning a conviction, years
after the fact and after extensive
intervening
litigation,
based
on
arguments not presented to the courts
below. Cf. *V115Miller-Elv. Dretke, 545
U.S. 23L 283. 125 S.Ct. 2317. 162
L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (THOMAS, J.,
dissenting).
FN* While the Court correctly
observes that the Louisiana
Supreme
Court
made
a
comparison between Mr. Brooks
and unstricken white jurors, that is
true only as to jurors Vicki
Chauffe, Michael Sandras, and
Arthur
Yeager.
1998-1078
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(La.9/6/06), 942 So.2d 484.
495-496. The Court, on the other
hand, focuses on Roland Laws and
John Donnes, who were never
discussed below in this context.
Because I believe that the trial court did
not clearly err in rejecting petitioner's
Batson challenge with respect to Mr.
Brooks, I also must address the strike of
Ms. Scott. The prosecution's neutral
explanation for striking Ms. Scott was
that she was unsure about her ability to
impose the death penalty. Like the claims
made about Mr. Brooks, there is very
little in the record either to support or to
undermine the prosecution's asserted
rationale for striking Ms. Scott. But the
trial court had the benefit of observing the
exchange between the prosecutor and Ms.
Scott, and accordingly was in the best
position to judge whether the prosecutor's
assessment of her response was credible.
When asked if she could consider the
death penalty, her first response was
inaudible. App. 360. The trial court, with
the benefit of contextual clues not
apparent on a cold transcript, was better
positioned to evaluate whether Ms. Scott
was merely softspoken or seemed hesitant
in her responses. Similarly, a firsthand
observation of demeanor is the only thing
that could give sufficient content to Ms.
Scott's ultimate response-"I think I
could," id, at 361-to determine whether
the prosecution's concern about her
willingness to impose the death penalty
was well founded. Given the trial court's
expertise
in
making
credibility
determinations
and
its
firsthand

knowledge of the voir dire exchanges, it
is entirely proper to defer to its judgment.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment
below.
U.S.La.,2008.
Snyder v. Louisiana
128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175, 76
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